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The paper provides a novel and critical analysis of privacy as an instrumental no-
tion within social and cultural contexts.  The argument suggests there is much  
utility in a novel  multiple-perspective approach to the study of  privacy in a so-
cio-legal context. It questions our assumptions about privacy by looking to a differ-
ing privacy culture - that of the India. It examines the Indian perception of privacy  
based on India's cultural values and offers an explanation for why India's concept  
of privacy is beyond the often dominated public-private dichotomy and why it has  
implicitly or explicitly affected the agenda for privacy theory by placing some issues  
in the limelight while leaving others backstage. The importance of the argument is  
due to its critical assessment of the current European approach (from the EC, ECJ  
and ECHR) where privacy is regarded as an inalienable right with a concrete psy-
chological  foundation.  I  argue that  privacy interests  are far more extensive and  
deeper than the European definition which can at best capture only some of the is-
sues which require elucidation when we litigate over privacy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is not a Western value; forms of privacy are found in every culture 
throughout the world. The difference among cultures lies not in whether 
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the need for privacy is present, but, rather, in the ways in which that need is  
met and the ways in which privacy is regulated. Privacy is culturally relat-
ive.1 It is contingent upon factors such as the social, moral, and political val-
ues of the people living in a given domain.2 This paper provides a critical 
analysis of privacy as an instrumental concept within social  and cultural 
contexts.3 For the purposes of my argument I will look at only two cultural 
implementations of privacy: India and Europe (though the argument is of 
course global). The paper presents two underlying reasons for the existent 
differences in privacy concerns between India and Western countries. One 
is regulatory but based upon culture and the other is more “purely” cultur-
al: these two elements provide the theme of this paper.
The conflict  between privacy and overall social good has yet to be re-
solved to determine the scope of privacy within the law. Since the time of 
Westin,4 many scholars have analysed the importance of privacy as it affects 
relationship development overall,5 interpersonal relations,6 and trust,7 Until 
recently, theories of privacy have been dominated by the psychological and 
socio-psychological views of individuals and their preferences for privacy.8 
More recently, theorists have examined the role of trust, with the goal of un-
1 See J.  H. Larson and N. Medora, “Privacy Preferences: A Cross-Cultural  Comparison of  
Americans and Asian Indians” (1992) 22 (1) International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 
55-66
2 Samuel Huntington in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Or-
der argues that “most important distinctions among peoples are [no longer] ideological, 
political, or economic. They are cultural.” Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and 
the Remaking of World Order (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 21
3 This paper insists that the relationship between privacy and culture should not be excluded 
or merely neglected as it has been done by many of the most highly-regarded and often 
cited philosophical and legal works on privacy. What I have attempted to show in this pa-
per is that the culture of a society affects, in a significant way all aspects of that society, in -
cluding its legal system. 
4 A.F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967)
5 Social psychologist Altman viewed privacy as a dialectical process of boundary regulation 
by embodied subjects.  See I.  Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Per-
sonal Space, Territory, Crowding (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1975)
6 A significant  amount  of  work has  also  been  done by  communication  scholars.  See  J.P. 
Caughlin and S. Petronio, “Privacy in Families” in A. L. Vangelisti (ed), Handbook of Fam-
ily Communication (Mahwah, NJ:  Erlbaum, 2004) 379-412;  See S.  Petronio,  Balancing the 
Secrets of Private Disclosures. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000). See also S. Petronio, 
Boundaries of Privacy: Dialectics of Disclosure. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002)
7 I. Altman, “Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?” (1977) 33(3)  
Journal of Social Issues 66 
8 Westin notes that privacy preferences are shaped by new technologies; social climates and 
public attitudes; and shifting policies and laws. See A.F.  Westin, “Social and Political Di-
mensions of Privacy” (2003) 59 Journal of Social Issues, 431-453 See also I. Altman, The En-
vironment  and  Social  behavior:  Privacy,  Personal  Space,  Territory,  Crowding (Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1975);  Newell analysed various approaches to the concept of pri-
vacy as found in the cross-disciplinary literature on privacy. See P. B Newell, “Perspectives 
on Privacy” (1994) 15 Journal of Environmental Psychology, 87-104  
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derstanding privacy as a dialectical process.9 However,  considerable gaps 
remain in our understanding of the influence of privacy within social and 
cultural contexts and, in particular, the influence of privacy preferences on 
larger social structures.10 So far, relatively little attention has been paid to 
cross-cultural factors,11 and the few studies that have addressed this topic 
have been inconclusive regarding the role of culture in privacy issues.12 Un-
derstanding the social  mechanisms involved in  maintaining privacy may 
lead to a better  understanding of privacy systems and their  inner work-
ings.13
Furthermore, rather than looking into the specific societal, political, and 
economic factors that have triggered the controversy, privacy researchers 
have made various assumptions about the meaning and extent of the right 
to privacy. Can a single definition of privacy possibly do justice to the cul-
tural variations14 that exist? In fact, even in the West we are in the midst of 
significant privacy conflicts; it is not clear what is believed to be protected, 
what is actually protected, and what is not protected in terms of privacy. 15 
Deep cultural differences still exist among European countries concerning 
what should be private.16 17 Altman has observed that although privacy is a 
universal process, cultures differ in terms of the behavioural mechanisms 
9 J. L. Steel,  “Interpersonal Correlates of Trust and Self-disclosure” (1991) 68  Psychological 
Reports,1319-1320
10 See L. Kisselburgh, “The Social Structure of Privacy in Socio-technological Realms” (2009) 
Paper presented at  the  annual  meeting of  the  International Communication Association 
(Marriott, Chicago, IL, May 20, 2009) 
11 See I.  Altman,  “Privacy Regulation:  Culturally  Universal  or  Culturally  Specific?”  (1977) 
33(3) Journal of Social Issues, 66-84 
12 As Bennett  and Raab remark,  ‘We have little  systematic  cross-national  survey  evidence 
about attitudes to privacy with which to investigate the nature and influence of wider cul -
tural attributes.’ See C. J. Bennett and C.D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instru-
ments in Global Perspective (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 15
13 For a detailed discussion on sociological analysis of historical changes in levels and types of 
privacy, see E. Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (University of Chica-
go Press, Chicago / London 1975)
14 A desire for privacy varies from culture to culture according to a complex range of factors. 
See B. Moore, Privacy Studies in Social and Cultural History (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe,  
1984) 
15 Many feminists have objected to the privacy right, arguing that the concept is connected to 
male dominance. See M.C. Nussbaum “Is Privacy Bad for Women? What the Indian Consti-
tutional Tradition Can Teach About Sex Equality” (2000) 25 Boston Law Review, 42-47
16 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy” (2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in Con-
text, 111, 105-136
17 Bygrave also argues that levels of privacy across nations and cultures, and across broad his-
torical periods, are in constant flux. This variation can be attributed to differences in percep-
tions of the degree to which privacy is or will be threatened. See  L. A.  Bygrave, “Privacy 
Protection in a Global Context -- a Comparative Overview” (2010) 56 Scandinavian Studies in  
Law, 327;  See also  M. Tugendhat and I.  Christie,  (eds.)  The Law of Privacy and The Media 
(OUP, 2002) Section 5.2
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used  to  regulate  desired  levels  of  privacy.18 Protecting  privacy  requires 
unique regulatory mechanisms involving an ongoing, discursive and optim-
izing process.
This  paper  analyses  why privacy  is  more  than just  a  simplistic  legal 
concept beyond the  normative questions  addressed by Western society. It 
suggests multiple approaches to the study of privacy in a socio-legal con-
text. Further, it examines philosophical questions about the concept of pri-
vacy based on India’s cultural values.  An analysis of both Western and In-
dian positions uncovers parallels  and similarities.  There seems to be ad-
equate common ground to allow for the building of a bridge between the 
two strands of thought. The paper also explains why India’s concept of pri-
vacy often extends beyond the dominant public-private dichotomy, as well 
as why it has implicitly or explicitly affected the overall agenda for privacy 
theory by drawing some issues into the limelight while leaving others back-
stage.
The notion of privacy differs throughout the world because the cultures 
in  which  privacy takes  root  and inheres  itself  differ.  Cultural  relativism 
maintains that the content of rights enjoyed by a community is determined 
by culture,19 and local cultural traditions determine the existence and scope 
of rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society.
Why is the Indian approach to privacy, which is dominated by its own 
cultural norms, of value to Western thinking about the subject? For me, the 
debate is  about avoiding a  culturally biased approach20 and,  at  the same 
time, restraining from the imposition of Western norms21 of privacy and in-
dividuality on the rest of the world, including India, since it is often diffi-
cult, if  not impossible,  to understand other societies based upon Western 
18 I. Altman, “Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?” (1977) 33(3)  
Journal of Social Issues, 66 
19 F. R. Teson, “International Human Rights and Relativism” (1985) 25 Virginia Journal of Inter-
national Law, 869, 870
20 For example, Hofstede found that many American politicians have difficulty recognising 
that their type of capitalism is culturally unsuitable for more collectivist societies and can 
have strongly disruptive effects on these societies.  I make a similar argument in the context 
of  privacy  in  this  paper.  G.  Hofstede,  Culture’s  Consequences,  International  Differences  in  
Work-Related Values (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980) 389; See also G. Hofstede, “The 
Cultural Relativity of Organisational Practices and Theories” (1983) 14 (2) Journal of Interna-
tional Business Studies, 89, 75-89
21 Snyder has argued that anthropologists, like some sociologists of law, reject Western juris-
prudence as the only source of analytic concepts or, more importantly, as guidelines for re-
search. F.G. Snyder, “Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction” 
(1981) 8 (2) British Journal of Law and Society, 141, 141-180
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conceptions of law.22 More specifically, I argue along the lines of Pospisil’s 
approach that one’s understanding of legal phenomena can be enhanced at 
a general level: not in a natural law cultural vacuum, but in a conceptual 
space that necessarily partakes of the specific  cultural examples that feed 
it.23 Legal constructs will manifest themselves in accord with the unique cul-
tural traditions in which they are embedded.24 Here I simply want to stress 
that cultural differences across nations not only permit but require signific-
ant allowances for cross-cultural variations in privacy regulation.
Newell argues that differences in methods of privacy regulation can lead 
to problems when relocating from one culture to another.25 In the West, an 
individual is recognised as the true unit of being and the organic building 
block of society. In contrast, Indian culture has been built around collect-
ives, where the individual is always part of the whole in relation to which 
his or her existence is defined. An individual is never considered an entity 
unto oneself in India.26 This provides an argument in support of the adapta-
tion of privacy preferences which are beneficial to communities rather than 
individuals.27 Hence,  I argue that culture should simultaneously assert an 
exception and create opposition to a certain type of privacy rights. The basic 
lesson is that rights advocates cannot get too far ahead of the values of the 
majority of the people. In general, laws that are not in accord with the val-
ues of a particular society will be difficult to enforce.
The literature introduced in the next section explores the critical role that 
context plays in the structuring of privacy expectations and interests, as as-
serted by privacy theorists. Following that, I argue for the need to study pri-
vacy and privacy preferences in the context of Indian culture. In this sec-
22 P. Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv (OUP, 1968); See L. Pospisil, Anthropology of  
Law: A Comparative Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); See also L. Pospisil, “Modern 
and Traditional Administration of Justice in New Guinea” (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Plural-
ism, 93
23 L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)
24 L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)
25 P. B Newell, “Cross-Cultural Comparison of Privacy Definitions and Functions: A Systems 
Approach” (1998) 18 Journal of Environmental Psychology, 357, 357-371
26 For a criticism of the Western character of the concept of human rights from an Indian point  
of view, see: R. Panikkar, ‘Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?’ (1982) 120  
Diogenes, 75-102
27 Similarly,  traditional Thai values and culture are not conducive to the assimilation of the 
concepts of privacy rights, as Thai culture is based on collectivism. For a provocative ex-
ploration  of  Thai  perspectives  on  privacy,  see  P.  Ramasoota,  “Privacy:  A Philosophical 
Sketch and a Search for a Thai Perception” (2001) 4(2) Manusya: Journal of Humanities, 98, 89–
107
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tion, I also analyse a number of Indian cases that highlight the many cultur-
al differences which exist, including those that are readily apparent as well 
as those that are so subtle they are often overlooked. In reality, simply be-
cause  the same terminology may be  used by different  cultures  does not 
mean that this terminology is being used or understood in the same context. 
Hence, in the fourth section, I take a closer look at the current regulatory 
framework in India, and particularly at the Indian Constitution, and explore 
whether the meaning of privacy in India has changed and, if so, to what de-
gree. The potential consequences of such change in India are also explored.
Finally,  I  conclude  by arguing  for  a  differentiated  understanding  of 
Western and Indian perceptions of privacy and for anchoring the debate 
about privacy regulation in India firmly in the cultural experiences of its 
people. Such an undertaking calls for an interrogation of the relationships 
between form and substance of the law within a socio-legal context in India.  
Evidence suggests that compensatory social mechanisms are present in In-
dia that allow for the regulation of privacy when such formal regulation is 
not present in the Indian constitution. These time-honoured social mechan-
isms have proven capable of providing necessary privacy protections. In-
stead of following a strict regulatory approach, historically, India has taken 
a prescriptive approach to the right  to privacy through a wholly unique 
blend of constitutional law, social norms, conventions, and sanctions that 
are worthy of closer examination.
2. PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: THE CONCEPT
People employ “context”28 in their thinking about privacy.29 The definitions 
of privacy vary significantly in different fields, ranging from a right or enti-
tlement in law30, to a state of boundary regulation, limited access or isola-
tion in philosophy31 and psychology32, to control in social sciences33 and in-
28 See H. Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stan-
ford University Press, 2010); See H. Nissenbaum, “Privacy as Contextual Integrity” (2004) 
79 (1) Washington Law Review, 101-158 ; D. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2008);See also J. E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of  
Everyday Practice (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2012); See A.D. Moore,  Privacy  
Rights: Moral and Legal Foundations (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010)
29 I have deliberately relied upon sources from the 1960’s through 1980’s as most of the semin-
al scholarship in the field was produced during this period. This period is also important as 
the paper focus on the cultural  distinctions in privacy development and deals  with the 
philosophical and anthropological foundations of privacy.  
30 S. Warren and L.D. Brandeis, “The right to privacy” (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review, 193–220
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formation systems34. Numerous works in diverse fields have immensely im-
proved our understanding of privacy at the individual, organizational, and 
societal levels; however, despite many attempts,35 it is still unclear if differ-
ent  types  of  privacy  have  distinct  experiential  correlates  or  should  be 
treated separately.36
In principle  every individual  should have the same claim to privacy. 
Thus,  from a socio-psychological  perspective  one individual’s  exercise  of 
privacy must submit to the equal claim of every other individual. However, 
in reality this approach entails some loss of privacy for everyone or high-
lights uneven power relations37, so the question becomes who enjoys what 
privacy and how. Moore applies a social evolutionary approach and argues 
that personal privacy cannot prevail  because society’s concerns outweigh 
those of individuals.38 Privacy is  often seen as in tension with the needs of 
wider society, as it may substantially reduce the opportunity to engage in 
collective action.39 Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that, as with 
other social values, some variations in the nature of privacy and some in-
equality in the distribution of privacy do exist.40
Two  main  problems  have  hindered  the  establishment  of  a  unifying 
framework for the study of privacy. First, the majority of attempts to define 
31 F.Schoeman, “Privacy and intimate information” in F. Schoeman (ed.),  Philosophical dimen-
sions of privacy: An Anthology (CUP, 1984) 403-417, See A. Westin, “The Origins of Modern  
Claims to Privacy”,  in F. Schoeman (ed.),  Philosophical dimensions of privacy: An Anthology  
(CUP, 1984) 56-74
32 Altman  incorporates  both  social  and  environmental  psychology  in  understanding  the 
nature  of  privacy.  See I.  Altman,  The  environment  and  social  behaviour  (Monterey,  CA: 
Brooks/Cole,  1975)  See  also  S.T.  Margulis,  “Privacy  as  a  social  issue  and  behavioural 
concept” (2003) 59 (2) Journal of Social Issues,  243-262
33 Westin provides a link between secrecy and privacy.  See  A.  Westin,  Privacy and freedom 
(New York: Atheneum, 1967) 
34 L. Palen and P. Dourish, “Unpacking ‘privacy’ for a networked world” in Proceedings of the  
SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems,  (ACM, 2003) 129-136
35 W.A. Parent, “Privacy, Morality and the Law” (1983) 12 Philosophy & Public Affairs, 269 and 
see also F.Schoeman, (1984) “Privacy and intimate information” in F. Schoeman (ed.), Philo-
sophical dimensions of privacy (CUP, 1984) 403-417
36 R.Taylor  and  G.  Ferguson,  “Solitude  and  Intimacy:  Linking  territoriality  and  Privacy” 
(1980) 4(4) Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 227-239
37 V. J. Derlega, and A.L. Chaikin, “Privacy and self-disclosure in social relationships” (1977)  
33 Journal of Social Issues,102–115
38 B. Moore, Privacy Studies in Social and Cultural History (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984) 274 
39 It can also be argued that privacy rights can have detrimental effect on societal needs. See R. 
A. Posner, “The Right to Privacy” (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review, 393–422 (Posner criticised 
privacy  rights  from  an  economic  perspective)  Etzioni  critically  argued  against  privacy 
rights from a communitarian perspective. See also A. Etzioni,  The Limits of Privacy (Basic 
Books, New York, 1999) 
40 C.J. Bennett and C.D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 35 
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privacy are inadequate; they focus either too specifically or too broadly on a 
particular topic. The result is a narrow conception of privacy that is not gen-
eralisable  or  a  definition  so  vague  as  to  be  methodologically  useless. 
Second, the work on privacy tends to be value-driven.41 Authors, whether 
speaking in privacy's defence or advocating its reduction, begin their work 
with strong biases and predetermined goals, and their approach naturally 
affects their questions, data, findings, and conclusions.42 Along these same 
lines, referring to the gap between sociological approaches to law, Leith ar-
gues that there is an inherent contradiction in sociological terms when we 
contextualise the legal right of privacy as an individualistic concept of the 
‘right to be left alone’43 and as a stand-alone fundamental right, rather than 
part of a social process.44 A theory of self and society is an essential require-
ment of any coherent and critical legal understanding of the nature of pri-
vacy. That is, if we are to begin to develop a socio-legal theory of privacy, 
we need a socio-legal framework to balance privacy rights with other com-
peting – and frequently more important – rights.45
However, one of the reasons for difficulties in discussing questions of 
privacy in the socio-legal context has been the lack of an adequate method 
which would be acceptable to most social scientists for interpretation or un-
derstanding. Social patterns and values today are too diverse, decentralized, 
and purposefully different to provide a foundation for general rules of dis-
course  at  the  level  of  specificity  required  for  the  protection  of  privacy. 
Hence, the socio-legal argument about privacy is surrounded by dichotom-
ies, for instance, ‘individual vs. community, autonomy vs. heteronomy, and 
identity vs. difference’.46 Consequently, in the analysis of privacy in a so-
cio-legal context, one tendency is to theorise “the legal” by drawing on crit-
41 See A.D. Moore, Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal Foundations (Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2010); see also  A.D. Moore,  “Values, Objectivity, and Relationalism” (2004) 38  The  
Journal  of  Value  Inquiry,  75-90; A.D. Moore,  “Privacy:  Its  Meaning and Value.” (2003)  40 
American Philosophical Quarterly, 215-227
42 D.V.S.  Kasper, “The Evolution (Or Devolution) of Privacy” (2005) 20 (1)Sociological Forum, 
69-92
43 In the U.K., the Younger Committee understood privacy as “seclusion” but privacy does 
not have to be seclusion or isolation. 
44 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy”(2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in Con-
text, 105, 105-136
45 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy” (2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in Con-
text,106, 105- 136
46 R. Capurro, “Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective”(2005) 7(1) Ethics and Information Techno-
logy, 37-47
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ical theories and at the same time treating “the social” as if it were not prob-
lematic.
There are several sceptical  and critical accounts of privacy;47 however, 
developing  a  legal  concept  of  privacy  depends  upon  the  approach  one 
wishes to adopt. For example,  considerable differences exist  between the 
European  and  the  US  approach  to  privacy.48 In  legal-philosophical  dis-
course, there are divergent uses of privacy. Philosophical debates concern-
ing definitions are deeply affected by the development of privacy protection 
in the law, regardless of whether a right to privacy exists, and the extent to 
which such a right, if it does exist, is restricted.  Archetypal privacy theories 
propose that one of privacy's main functions is to help maintain an indi-
vidual's self-identity by creating personal boundaries.49 Although conceptu-
al and everyday definitions vary, a major emphasis is also put on the lim-
ited-access view of privacy. The limited-access view proposes that privacy 
represents control over unwanted access or, alternatively, regulation of, lim-
itations  on,  or  exemption  from  scrutiny,  surveillance50,  or  unwanted  ac-
cess.51 This limited-access view is consistent with the concept of privacy in 
the US52 and it  has  been legally recognised and protected there for more 
than a century.53 Gavison suggested that  privacy should be defined as ‘a 
limitation of others’ access to an individual,’ in which ‘access’  consists of a 
complex combination of three elements - secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.54 
47 See J. Thomson, “The Right to Privacy” (1975) 4  Philosophy and Public Affairs, 295-314 See 
also R. Bork,  The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1990) See  R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981) See C. MacKinnon,  Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press,1989)
48 In the US the Privacy Act of 1974 5 U.S.C. § 552a has a much narrower focus than that of 
Europe. The development of ‘Safe Harbor’ agreements shows the difference in expectations 
between the two systems.
49 See I. Altman, The Environment and Social Behaviour (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole,1975) see 
also A. Westin,  Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum Press, 1970)
50 Nissenbaum argues in favour of a degree of protection of privacy in the public sphere. H. 
Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public” 
(1998) 17  Law and Philosophy, 559-596; see  N. Moreham, “Privacy in Public  Places” (2006) 
65(3)  Cambridge Law Journal,  617-618; see also E. Paton-Simpson, “Privacy and the Reason-
able Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places”, (2000) 50 (3) University of Toronto  
Law Journal, 305-346; C. Slobogin, “Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity” (2002) 72 (1) Mississippi Law Journal, 213-299; S. A. Cohen, Privacy,  
Crime and Terror: Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril  (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 
2005) 34-35; see also M. Zimmer, “But the data is already public: on the ethics of research in 
Facebook”, (2010) 12 (4) Ethics & Information Technology, 313-325;
51 S.T. Margulis, “Privacy as a social issue and behavioural concept” (2003) 59 (2) Journal of So-
cial Issues,  243-262
52 Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479, 85 S. Ct 1678, 14 L.Ed 2nd 510 (1965)
53 D. Meeler, “Is Information All We Need to Protect?” (2008) 1(1) The Monist, 151–169
54 R. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal, 421, 428
10 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:1
Thus, the concept of privacy is best understood as a concern for limited ac-
cessibility, and at the core of privacy protection is control of that which in-
deed “enters” someone’s private space. Many analyses of privacy pertain to 
partly overlapping concepts such as “freedom” and “liberty”. Privacy can 
also mean “autonomy” in the sense of choice and control.55 Feldman charac-
terises privacy as freedom of choice.56
Altman differentiates between the desired and achieved levels of privacy 
and notes that one’s desired privacy depends on the success of interperson-
al boundary-control processes which are dialectic in nature.57  He proposed 
that there is an ‘optimal degree of desired access of the self to the others at  
any moment in time’58 by which a person asserts control over how much he 
or she is open to various others. This desire for control over the social con-
tact is associated with one’s culture and may vary over time and on many 
occasions will be influenced by a particular set of circumstances or a partic-
ular setting.59 But what does this control mean? In the psychological literat-
ure, the illusion of control is defined as a cognitive bias by which one is con-
vinced that he can influence an event with his behaviour, while rationally it 
is clear that he has no power to affect the outcome,60 which means a distinc-
tion can also be made between “actual” privacy and “perceived” privacy.
In contrast with the literature referred to above, which defines privacy in 
terms of control, Wacks argued that the protection afforded by the law of 
privacy should be limited to information, which in his words, ‘relates to the 
individual and which it would be reasonable to expect him to regard as in-
timate or sensitive and therefore to want to withhold or at least to restrict its 
collection, use, or circulation’.61 According to this hypothesis, a right to pri-
vacy would be recognized by law; it would extend only over a limited, con-
ventionally designated, area of information,62 ‘symbolic of the whole institu-
55 B. Rossler, The Value of Privacy (Cambridge: Polity, 2005)
56 D. Feldman, “Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty” (1994) 47 
Current Legal Problems,  41
57 I.  Altman, “Privacy  regulation:  Culturally  universal  or  culturally  specific?”  (1977)  33(3) 
Journal of Social Issues, 66-84
58 I. Altman, The environment and social behaviour (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole,1975) 11
59 D. M. Pedersen, “Psychological Functions of Privacy” (1997) 17(2) Journal of Environmental  
Psychology, 147-156
60 E.J. Langer, “The Illusion of Control” (1975) 32(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
311-328
61 R. Wacks, Personal Information - Privacy and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1993) 26
62 H. Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Pub-
lic”(1998) 17 Law and Philosophy, 559-596
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tion of privacy’.63 However, no single type of information is considered per-
sonal in all situations. Wacks pointed out that although focusing attention 
on an individual or intruding upon his solitude is inherently objectionable 
in its own right, our concern for the individual’s privacy in these circum-
stances is strongest when the person is engaging in activities that we would 
normally consider private.64 Hence, it can be argued that access to personal 
information65 is necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be defined as 
falling within the scope of privacy. The presumption that the personal con-
trol of information is the ultimate goal to be achieved is ideological rather 
than theoretical.66 What is further required is that the information must be 
of an intimate and sensitive nature,67 such as information about a person’s 
sexual proclivities, but content may differ considerably from society to soci-
ety and depends upon the society’s culture. Whatever may be the nature of 
this information, there is no denying that this high level of concern about in-
formation privacy is the reason for the creation of new privacy legislation in 
several countries. However, historically, protection of information has been 
prominent but not exhaustive in the development of privacy law.
Privacy  is  hardly  a  one-dimensional  construct.  Burgoon  et  al.  distin-
guished four dimensions of privacy as ‘the ability to control and limit phys-
ical, interactional, psychological and informational access to the self or one’s 
group’.68 Solove attempted to conceptualize privacy under six general head-
ings:  ‘(1) the right to be let  alone—Samuel Warren and Louis  Brandeis’s 
famous formulation for the right to privacy; (2) limited access to the self—
the ability to shield oneself from unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy—
the concealment of certain matters from others; (4) control over personal in-
formation—the ability to exercise control over information about oneself; (5) 
personhood—the protection of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity; 
63 C. Fried, “Privacy” (1968) 77 The Yale Law Journal, 493
64 R. Wacks, Personal Information - Privacy and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 26
65 Personal information includes information about gender, income, name, address and/or in-
formation about personal activities, proclivities, interests.
66 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy” (2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in Con-
text, 112, 105-136
67 The House of Lords used this sense of privacy in Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., 
upholding Naomi Campbell’s right to keep the information out of the public eye. Privacy in 
this sense may be a condition for the exercise of autonomy.
68 J.K. Burgoon, R. Parrott, B.A. LePoire, D.L. Kelley, J.B. Walther, and D. Perry,  “Maintaining 
and restoring privacy through communication in different types of relationship” (1989) 6 
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 132, 131–158
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and (6) intimacy—control over, or limited access to, one’s intimate relation-
ships or aspects of life’.69
While these elements are independent of each other, they are also re-
lated,  and  a  bit  of  reflection  suggests  difficulty  with  all  of  them.  These 
normative views may well be disconnected from a culture and do not take 
into consideration a society’s boundaries on the ‘right to privacy’. It is ap-
parent  that  privacy's  status  as  a  right  is  precarious,  depending  on  the 
caprice of the courts and social conventions. Thus, it is not surprising that, 
as Solove concludes, even after more than a century of American lawyers 
wrangling over the definition of privacy, that ‘with a few exceptions, the 
discourse conceptualizes privacy in terms of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions’.  In other words,  most American theorists  attempt to conceptualize 
privacy by isolating one or more of its common essential or core character-
istics. He argues that privacy is better understood by drawing from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances.  As Wittgenstein suggested, 
certain concepts might not have a single common characteristic; rather, they 
draw from a common pool of similar elements.70
In contrast, the EU, based on the argument that safeguarding privacy 
must be a legal imperative, has taken a strong initiative toward a top-down 
approach regarding privacy.71 The “regulation model” proffered by the EU 
holds  that  standardised  privacy  protection  regulations  (eventually  on  a 
global scale) are necessary. In other words, in Europe, privacy is regarded 
as an inalienable  right  because  it  is  so important  to  “dignity” and one’s 
sense of autonomy. Leith proposed that the current European legal framing 
of the debate sets explains privacy as a reified concept that combines indi-
vidual  psychological  needs and individual  (fundamental)  rights72.  In this 
framing, he observes, the social nature is ignored.73 As an inalienable right, 
like human or civil rights, privacy in European societies is provided to the 
individual as a sphere of freedom and autonomy.74 However, privacy in-
69 D.J. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy”(2002) 90 California Law Review,1092
70 D.J. Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy”(2002) 90 California Law Review,1091
71 Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (ECHR) provides: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence’.
72 See National Panasonic (UK) Ltd v EC Commission Case 136/79 [1980] ECR 2033
73 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy” (2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in Con-
text, 106, 105-136
74 To be protected against ‘arbitrary interferences’ by public authorities See Ollson v. Sweden, 
(1988) ECHR (Ser. A130), Para. 61. See also Amman v. Switzerland, [2000-II] ECHR, Para. 50.
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terests are both more extensive and deeper than the EU's definition allows.75 
That  definition  can  at  best  capture  much  of  the  legal  extension  of  the 
concept of privacy, but not the nature of socio-cultural notions of privacy.
Much of the rhetoric does not accurately show the actual effect of the 
legal framing of privacy, but it can have a powerful effect upon legislator,  
judge, and litigant. This “individualistic” approach is problematic: it leads 
us to attempt the development of a pathological society in which social be-
nefit  is  forever playing second fiddle  to  individual  desire,  and it  further 
leads to legal reasoning which must – to accord with the rhetoric of the le-
gislature – involve complex legal fictions.76 However, even though the EU 
has attempted to provide a uniform conception of privacy, European law 
recognises privacy haphazardly because privacy is widely perceived to be 
“a good thing”. The literature has generally argued that we are under in-
creasing surveillance or have lost privacy; researchers have contended that 
we must work toward protecting privacy rather than creating detailed solu-
tions for each element within the indefinable notion of privacy. Leith sug-
gested that rhetorical  solutions are not effective because the rhetoric sur-
rounding privacy rights developed from a biased position that failed to con-
sider  the evidence regarding social  communication.77 Hence, perhaps not 
surprisingly, communication theorists like Kisselburgh, in an effort to  ex-
pand understanding about how privacy is enacted in social contexts,78 ad-
vocated in favour  of reconceptualising the framework for examining pri-
vacy within the context of the meta-theoretical traditions of communication 
theory as postulated by Craig,79 and these theorists have suggested multiple 
and multi-theoretical approaches to the study of privacy.80
The fundamental question is whether privacy is actually important. Ing-
ham states that ‘man, we are repeatedly told is a social animal, and yet he 
75 The European Court of Human Rights has delivered several decisions to specify the content 
and the extent of the right to privacy.  See further F.  Bignami, “Privacy and Law Enforce-
ment in the European Union: The Data Retention Directive” (2007) 8 (1) Chicago Journal of  
International Law, 233-255
76 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy”(2006) 2(2)  International Journal of Law in Con-
text, 106
77 See P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy”(2006) 2(2)  International Journal of Law in  
Context, 105-136 
78 L.  Kisselburgh,  The social  structure and construction of  privacy in socio-technological  realms.   
(Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 2008)
79 R.T. Craig, “Communication theory as a field” (1999) 9(2) Communication Theory, 119-161 
80 L.  Kisselburgh,  The social  structure and construction of  privacy in socio-technological  realms.   
(Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 2008)
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constantly seeks to achieve a state of privacy’.81 Perhaps the best  way to 
fully answer this question would be to offer a social theory of privacy and a 
more detached empirical study, which is beyond the scope of this article.  
However, it is obvious that privacy is to some extent important to everyone. 
Indeed,  despite  definitional  difficulties,  privacy provides  what  Lyon and 
Zureik call a ‘mobilizing concept to express real social anxieties and fears’.82 
The variable nature of the meaning of privacy, as with any component of 
nonmaterial culture, makes it difficult to arrive at an exact definition.83 It is 
quite possible that in the digital age privacy as the conscious and controlled 
protection of personal information cannot be sustained.  Then again,  it  is 
precisely at this point that it also appears that privacy does not carry just a 
simple black or white definition.  Even if we develop a clearer concept of 
privacy, it will not dictate how privacy should be balanced against other in-
dividual rights and public concerns. One may have an important interest in 
privacy that for legal or social reasons cannot be protected.  Leith said that 
‘those who approach the notion of privacy with technical  understanding 
and a reasonably critical attitude toward the assumptions which underlie 
the rhetoric of privacy can be struck by the mismatch between perception of 
what is happening in the world and what is actually happening in the new 
information processing industries’.84 Only a small percentage of society is 
concerned with perceptions of the damaging effects of technology and these 
perceptions  are  frequently  associated  with  highly  moral  and  ideological 
judgments. Meanwhile, most people pay virtually no attention.85
In my view, taken together, these observations suggest that the demarca-
tion between individuals and society is not fixed and may change over time; 
there is no fixed realm of the private. Something that today seems like a vi-
olation of privacy tomorrow can be considered normal. This relative feature 
of privacy is well known but not often emphasised.  Hence, the individual 
structural axis of legal studies is inadequate to understand the ramifications 
of continued dominance of society for development of law, the role of cul-
81 R.  Ingham, (1978)”Privacy and psychology” in J. B. Young (ed.),Privacy  (Chichester, UK: 
Wiley, 1978) 45, 35–59
82 D. Lyon and E. Zureik, Computers, Surveillance, and Privacy (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1996)16
83 D.V.S Kasper, “The Evolution (Or Devolution) of Privacy” (2005) 20 (1) Sociological Forum, 
69-92
84 P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy” (2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in 
Context, 119, 105-136 
85 See P. Leith, “The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy” (2006) 2(2) International Journal of Law in  
Context, 106, 105-136
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ture in the constitution of different types of societies, and relations between 
people within societies. Long and Quek argued that the EU’s approach to 
regulation  has  little  relationship  to  the  privacy  concerns  of  European 
people;86 rather, it  highlights the international differences in regulation of 
privacy. This does not imply that a legal concept of privacy should be dis-
regarded; instead, the concept of privacy must take into consideration the 
cultural context.
3. PRIVACY IN CULTURAL CONTEXT
Culture encompasses the values and meanings produced in a given society 
by  various  phenomena  and  experiences.87 What  does  privacy  mean  for 
people in the cultural context? Privacy responds to the societal culture; it re-
flects deeper values and assumptions held in the larger culture.88 India’s in-
fluential cultural distinctiveness and cultural values are known to affect its 
population's attitudes toward privacy and these characteristics are identi-
fied marginally with its regulatory approach. Although it is apparent that 
‘levels of privacy across nations and cultures, and across broad historical 
periods, are in constant flux,’89 the definitions of privacy are culturally and 
historically biased towards the West and thus may not apply to other socio-
cultural contexts.
While I do not condemn the Western perception of privacy, I argue that 
the existence of multiple cultures and philosophies prompts questions re-
garding the appropriateness of hegemonic relations and the privileging of 
one culture over another. The question is whether privacy is deemed inher-
ently valuable by all people or whether its value is relative to cultural differ-
ences. Ethical relativism holds that morality is relative to the norms of one’s 
culture90 and that the perception of whether an action is right or wrong dif-
fers according to the moral norms of the society in which it is practiced91. In 
reality, there is diversity within cultures, and there are certainly many dif-
86 W.J. Long and M.P. Quek, “Personal data privacy protection in an age of globalization: The 
US-EU Safe Harbor compromise” (2002)  9 (3) Journal of European Public Policy,325–344
87 A practice of the culture into which an individual is born is responsible for creation of “in-
formational, material, and social— structures we know and how we come to know it.” See J.  
E. Cohen,  Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice (New 
Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2012)
88 V. W.  Kupritz, “The Dynamics of Privacy Regulation: A Conceptual Model for HRD and 
Organizations” (2000) 38 (1) Journal of Industrial Teacher Education, 29-59
89 L. A. Bygrave, “Privacy Protection in a Global Context- A Comparative Overview” (2010) 56 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 327
90 M. Velasquez, C. Andre, T. Shanks, and M.J. Meyer, “Ethical Relativism” (1992) 5(2) Issues  
in Ethics, 2-5 
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ferences of opinion about the importance of privacy, what the issues are, 
and how they should be addressed. Patterns of privacy, as evidenced by an-
thropological research differ significantly from society to society92 and it is 
affected by the context of perception. At the broader level of conceptualisa-
tion there has been little disagreement about privacy, and almost all cul-
tures appear to value privacy,93 even if those cultures differ in their ways of 
seeking and obtaining privacy. Thus, we cannot apply a universal code of 
laws across the world given our differences in cultures and beliefs.94
Utilizing the definition of culture as something that has varied visible as-
pects and deeper learned aspects that are unchangeable, one finds that al-
though history itself is littered with examples of ‘uninvited cultural inva-
sion and overthrow’95,  cultural  values have not  simply  been reshaped to 
conform to the values and preferences of the victor.  I argue that the inva-
sion of culture causes a particular type of “privacy mistrust” that can be un-
derstood in the larger context of “civilisation scepticism”.96 Hence, the relat-
ively homogenous perspective of the Western democracies fails to appreci-
ate the diversity in a  nation like India which has a distinctive, influential 
cultural heritage that springs from its own unique background and determ-
ines  the  ways  in  which  its  citizens  express  and  understand  the  same 
concept.
The term “culture” has also been applied in historical and sociological 
literature to denote a wide array of referents, including the “social whole”, 
as well as the “basic values, practices and beliefs” of a social group97. What 
makes Indian culture special is the concept of autonomous, non-distinctive 
individuals living outside of society. When it comes to ‘man-in-society’, In-
dian views are not unique; indeed, their views are prototypical and lucid 
91 M. Velasquez, C. Andre, T. Shanks, and M.J. Meyer, “Ethical Relativism” (1992) 5(2) Issues  
in Ethics, 2-5 
92 J. M.Roberts and T. Gregor, “Privacy: A Cultural View” in R. J. Pennock and J. W. Chapman 
(eds.) Privacy (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) 199-225
93 S. H Schwartz and W. Bilsky, “Towards a psychological structure of human values” (1990) 
53 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  550-562
94 In other words, according to cultural relativist view “there is an irreducible diversity among 
cultures because each culture is a unique whole with parts so intertwined that none of them 
can be understood or evaluated without reference to the other parts and to the cultural 
whole, the so-called pattern of culture’’. S. Lawson, “Democracy and the problem of cultur-
al relativism: normative issues for international politics” (1998) 12 (2) Global Society: Journal  
of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 251–271
95 T. Haywood, Info-rich info-poor: access and exchange in the global information society (London: 
Bowker-Saur,1995)131
96 Author’s own emphasis
97 See J.B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, (Polity Press,1990) 124-127
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expressions of a widespread mode of social thought98, but they do diverge 
considerably from the “natural man” tradition of Western social thought99. 
The Western “autonomous individual” imagines the incredible, that he lives 
within an inviolate protected region (the extended boundaries of the self) 
where he is ‘free to choose’100; for him, the meaning of privacy and respect 
for privacy concerns this “individuality”,101 it is largely about achieving in-
dividual goals of self-realization,102 an integral feature of what Bennett and 
Raab term as the privacy paradigm103. Indeed,  this  respect for  autonomy 
and individuality  is  essential  to  the  basic  moral  and legal  norms in  the 
West.104 This is in contrast to an alternate understanding of the holistic cul-
ture of India105, which seems to embrace a socio-centric conception of the re-
lationship of individual to society (‘the individual is embedded in a web of 
social relations’106 to which his or her existence is defined). These relational 
selves focus more on communication and other practices intended to foster 
a sense of community. According to Hofstede107, India is a collectivist soci-
98 See D. W. Murray, “What is the Western Concept of the Self? on Forgetting David Hume” 
(1993)  21 (1) Ethos, 3-23
99 R. Shweder, and E. Bourne, “Does the Concept of the Person Vary Cross-Culturally?” in  R. 
Shweder and R. LeVine (eds.,) Culture Theory:  Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion(CUP, 1984) 
158-199
100 According to Miller, the Western conceptions of morality are organized around concepts 
such as individual rights and care. J. Miller, “Cultural Diversity in the Morality of Caring: 
Individually-Oriented Versus Duty-Based Interpersonal Moral Codes.”  (1994) 28 (1) Cross-
Cultural Research, 3–39;See also R. Shweder, and E. Bourne, “Does the Concept of the Per-
son Vary Cross-Culturally?” in R. Shweder and R. LeVine (eds.)  Culture Theory:  Essays on  
Mind, Self, and Emotion(CUP, 1984) 182, 158-199 
101 In contemporary Western societies, conceptions of the self-derived from liberal political the-
ory play an important role in constructing our socially situated notions of both selfhood and 
privacy. J. E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Prac-
tice (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2012)
102 A. F.  Westin,  Privacy and freedom (New York:  Atheneum, 1967)  39.  Privacy and privacy 
rights tend to focus on benefits for individuals. These benefits are about securing individu-
ality,  autonomy,  dignity,  emotional release,  and self-evaluation.  See also L.  A.  Bygrave, 
Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague / London / New York, 2002) 133-134
103 C.J. Bennett and C.D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 
104 R. Capurro, “Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective” (2005) 7 (1) Ethics and Information Tech-
nology, 37–47
105 Indian philosophy accentuates on social duty, of ‘Indian values’ and consciousness. See A. 
Bharati, “The Self in Hindu Thought and Action.” in G. Marsella, A.J. DeVos, andF.L.K. Hsu 
(eds.), Culture and Self (New York: Tavistock, 1985); T. Chand, “The Individual in the Legal 
and Political Thought and Institutions of   India” in C.A. Moore (ed.), The Indian Mind: Es-
sentials  of Indian Philosophy and Culture,  (Honolulu:  East-West Center  Press/University of 
Hawaii Press, 1967)
106 Indian social and moral philosophy binds selves to social relations. See B. Parekh, “Private 
and Public  Spheres in India” (2009)  12  Critical Review of International Social and Political  
Philosophy, 317, 313-328
18 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:1
ety with a lower Individualism Index (IDV)108 and a higher Power Distance 
Index (PDI)109 compared to the UK or US, which are individualist societies 
with higher IDV in which an individual's importance is at least equal to, if 
not greater than, the importance of the collectivity.110  Hofstede has shown 
that individuals in collectivist societies have more faith in other people than 
those in individualist  societies111.  They thereby de-emphasize the self and 
thus individual privacy112 as an isolate, in favour of greater interaction and 
interconnectivity with others and for harmony and well-being of the com-
munity.113 This dual direction of privacy based on reciprocal relationships 
and  the  differences  in  perceptions  of  the  degree  to  which  privacy  is 
threatened explains why the Indian conception of privacy, essentially de-
rived  from  a  collectivist  mentality,  differs  from  its  Western  equivalents 
based on a more individualistic culture.
What then are the influences  of cultural specificity on privacy? It  has 
been shown that cultural values affect the development and maintenance of 
107 See G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organ-
izations Across Nations (Sage Publications, 2001) 79
      www.cyborlink.com/besite/hofstede.htm
108 The Individualism Index (IDV) measures the extent to which a society tends to emphasise 
individual rights versus collective goals. See G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing  
Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, (Sage Publications, 2001) 79
      www.cyborlink.com/besite/hofstede.htm
109 Power distance is defined as how a culture approaches and accepts inequality in status (i.e.,  
prestige, wealth and power). See further G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Val-
ues, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, (Sage Publications, 2001)
      www.cyborlink.com/besite/hofstede.htm
110 In the Western societies the notion of “self” is relational to “individualism”, on the contrary 
in India the individual is considered to be just one part of the society. For a detailed ana-
lyses of Western conceptions of self; See  F. Johnson, “The Western Concept of Self” in G. 
Marsella, A.J. DeVos, and F.L.K. Hsu(eds.), Culture and Self (New York: Tavistock, 1985); R. 
N. Bellah, et el., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985); A. De Tocqueville,  Democracy in America (New York: 
Signet, 2001) 
111 See G. Hofstede,  Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organ-
izations Across Nations, (Sage Publications, 2001) 
      www.cyborlink.com/besite/hofstede.htm
112 In these circumstances, individual rights and expectations vary with social conventions. Al-
though people do expect privacy regarding the self, they also recognize that social good is 
often equal to or greater than the individual’s need for personal privacy. See Court on its  
motion  v Union of India, 139 (2007) D.L.T. 244 (India) where prohibition was imposed on 
black films put on the windscreens of cars by owners for privacy as well as to shield them  
from the sun, on the ground that this was being used by criminals to perpetrate offences, of-
ten rape and molestation in moving vehicles.
113 Similar  social  thinking  is  also  found  in  Africa; “Ubuntu”,  best  described  as  a  com-
munity-based mindset in which the welfare of the group is greater than the welfare of a 
single individual in the group. See N.M. Kwamwangamalu and M. Nkonko, “Ubuntu in 
South Africa: a Sociolinguistic Perspective to a Pan-African Concept” (1999) 13(2)  Critical  
Arts Journal, 24-42
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social institutions, including political and legislative bodies114. Western soci-
eties came to view privacy as an important value that gave rise to a privacy 
interest or right recognized by law or social convention115 that is regulatory 
in nature. Although it is in the interest of Indian society to preserve both the 
individual rights aspects of privacy and the social value of privacy, privacy 
is still dominated by the moral concept of subjectivity116 – in which privacy 
is not permanent but dependent on situations, relationships, and disposi-
tional preferences. For example, while it is not common practice in the UK 
for general  practitioners (GPs)  to discuss  patient  information of the wife 
with her husband, such discussion is  quite common in India, where GPs 
regularly discuss  such issues with the husband or other  members of the 
family. Does this reduced control necessarily imply reduced privacy? On 
the contrary, this practice conforms to a consistent set of rules as developed 
within the Indian society that the level of privacy should not interfere with 
an individual’s  ability to  feel  emotionally safe and secure through social 
linkage.  I believe it  also means that “being private” in traditional  Indian 
concept includes sharing with “family” and within the “familial space” and 
evidence suggests that the desire to demarcate one’s life from others in the 
family is nearly non-existent but it is separate from the outside world as the 
privacy “of the family” is greatly valued.117 Consequently, a whole series of 
protocols  ranging  from body language,  spoken and written communica-
tions, cultural values and norms have been established to ensure that this 
distinction is well respected.118
Are any aspects of life inherently private and not just conventionally so? 
Ironically, there is a shared framework for understanding privacy.119 As dis-
cussed in the previous section, one of the interests most commonly associ-
ated with the term privacy is the interest in controlling access to and dis-
114 See G. Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind (McGraw-Hill: Berkshire, 
1991)
115 A. F. Westin, “Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy” (2003) 59 Journal of Social Issues, 
431  
116 This is opposite to a classic Western view of subject and identity as something permanent 
and even substantial. R. Capurro,  “Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective” (2005) 7(1) Ethics  
and Information Technology, 37–47
117 B. Parekh, “Private and Public Spheres in India” (2009)  12 Critical Review of International So-
cial and Political Philosophy, 313-328
118 H. Irwin, Communicating with Asia: Understanding People and Customs (Malaysia: Allen & Un-
win, 1996)
119 Importantly, although different cultures have different conventions about personal space 
and territory, as I have discussed later on in this section people in every culture use person-
al space and territory to manage interpersonal boundaries. See I. Altman, “Privacy Regula-
tion: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?” (1977) 33(3) Journal of Social Issues, 66-84 
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semination of information about oneself; hence, not surprisingly, in India 
and throughout the world people recognise that certain types of informa-
tion about oneself are privileged. However, if a limit on the dissemination 
of information is too rigidly applied it will result in arbitrariness. In India, 
people’s perception of privacy is also influenced by how people relate to, 
communicate and share each other’s professional, familial and personal in-
formation.
It is useful to couch this discussion of privacy on court decisions, espe-
cially decisions of the Indian High Courts and the Supreme Court, as the 
Court’s thinking on this issue can be seen as mirroring widely held views.  
Indeed, in T. Sareetha v T. Venkata Subbaiah120, it was held that what is un-
deniable  about any conception of privacy is  its  reference to the “human 
body” and control over personal identity.  A number of court decisions fur-
ther reflect the importance of privacy as a social issue and as a “social phe-
nomenon”. In Garesilal v Rasul Fathima121, the Court found that Indian wo-
men have always been protected from intrusion into the privacy of their 
homes. The home is the archetypal private space and it is seen as a tangible 
expression of the intangible culture. Privacy inside the house is a right of 
every woman, and cognitively much more so for a woman who has inhibi-
tions by custom or religious notions that cause her to seclude herself,  in-
cluding secluding herself in public places through observation of “purdah” 
(veil)122.
In Basai v Hasan Raza Khan123,  the Court recognised “purdah” as the 
basis of this right and held that it entitled the owner of one property to com-
pel the owner of another to modify the design or architecture of his prop-
erty so that the woman residing in the dominant tenements could be kept in 
“purdah”. According to the Court, the right is based on “natural modesty or 
human morality”. The Court, however, also held that the customary right to 
privacy can be claimed only with respect to apartments which are generally 
occupied and used by females; it does not extend to apartments ordinarily 
used by males. This conforms to the basis of the customary right of privacy 
being  the  purdah  system,  which  was  confined  to  the  protection  of 
120 AIR 1983 AP 356
121 AIR 1977 ALL. 118
122 “Purdah” literally means “curtain”. It is the practice of preventing women from being seen 
by men. This takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes and the requirement for wo-
men to cover their bodies and conceal their form. Purdah exists in various forms in the Is -
lamic world and among Hindu women in some parts of India.
123 AIR 1963 ALL. 143
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“purdahnasin” women and those parts of a house which are ordinarily oc-
cupied by females. Once established, it not only extends to women who are 
in the habit of observing “purdah”, but also to women of all races. How-
ever, it is equally true that the right of privacy cannot be extended to an op-
pressive extent.
A variety of social, economic and technological changes in India have, 
over the years, seemed to widen the arena within which the presumption of 
a right to privacy ought to operate. Also, over this period, the area within 
which private activities can take place has been extended beyond the home. 
In Shri Bhagwan Ramcbaudwji v Babu Purshottamdas124,  the Court ruled 
that ‘it would have to be decided in each case whether the right of privacy 
violated is substantial or material or whether the right of privacy claimed 
by  a  plaintiff  is  to  an  oppressive  extent’.  In  the  recent  case  of  the  Naz 
Foundation, the Delhi High Court held that  the right to privacy has been 
held to protect a ‘private space in which man may become and remain him-
self’.125 The judges predicated their application of the right to privacy in this 
case with a discussion of the concept of “dignity” and its presence in the In-
dian Constitution. The court observed: ‘at its least, it is clear that the consti-
tutional  protection  of  dignity  requires  us  to  acknowledge the  value and 
worth of all individuals as members of our society. It recognizes a person as 
a free being who develops his or her body and mind as he or she sees fit. At 
the root of dignity are the autonomy of the private will and a person's free-
dom of choice and action’126. Naz Foundation articulates a unique non-spa-
tial and portable understanding of privacy that extends beyond “place” into 
“person”. It is patently clear that the Indian culture of privacy is dominated 
by such factors as rights of the family, observation of the “purdah” and the 
belief that intrusion affects the modesty, dignity or decency of the person.
Interestingly, similar findings regarding people’s perception of privacy 
were reported in two surveys published by the School of Computer Science 
of Carnegie Mellon University127. Both surveys were quite revealing in the 
sense that they vividly underlined the great gap that separates the Western 
124 Second Appeal No. 101 of 1959 Decided on 25/11/1960
125 Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi WP(C) No.7455/2001 (2 July 2009). In the ‘Naz 
Foundation Case’, the Delhi High Court decided to strike down provisions criminalising 
homosexual sexual conduct on grounds of invasion of privacy.
126 Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi WP(C) No.7455/2001 (2 July 2009) Para 26
127 See P.  Kumaraguru and L. Cranor , “Privacy in India: Attitudes and Awareness”,  in Pro-
ceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Dubrovnik, Croatia: PET, 
2005)
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perception of privacy and the predominating perception in India.  The sur-
vey found that personal autonomy is not much valued in Indian society128 
and unlike some of the public opinion surveys in the West129, evidence from 
these surveys showed less cynicism over existing level of privacy. But the 
survey did not show that privacy is “less valued” in Indian culture; it is 
seen more as part of a “societal value” rather than an “individual value”. It 
confirms that Indians are more concerned with a different dimension of pri-
vacy and ascribe value to protecting the concerns that fall within that di-
mension; it is not seen as an “intrinsic good” but as an “instrumental good”. 
From this perspective, I argue that we must reject information acquisition 
and publication as solely determinative of privacy invasions. If we do so, 
and acknowledge that  privacy concerns encompass not  only information 
but also activity and physical access, then we have good reason to consider 
whether the realm of the private can properly be taken to include the sort of 
privacy interests protected in constitutional law as well as those associated 
with tort law. It  further  reemphasises  that privacy is  a highly  subjective 
value. Public policy and law can only establish rules, principles and proced-
ures if and when required or demanded (e.g., if there are concerns about in-
formation privacy, governments can become more involved as individuals 
are more likely to call for stronger privacy laws); it is also up to individuals 
to assert their own privacy interests and claims.
It seems to me that the question of privacy should be considered from an 
Indian perspective within these arguments and experiences.  What results 
from this discussion, I contend, is not a choice of one over the other, but 
rather a dualism. To me, a more effective argument for cultural relativity of 
privacy conceptions would be structured differently. Any reasonably de-
veloped culture has a basic understanding of privacy based on a ‘minimal 
conception’130. It is important to note here that this minimal conception is 
shared by all cultures. What is required is multiple matching between these 
128 With regard to cultural prescriptions and privacy, Kumaraguru and Cranor (2005) refer to 
the lack of an explicit privacy concern. See P. Kumaraguru and L. Cranor , “Privacy in In-
dia: Attitudes and Awareness”,  in Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (Dubrovnik, Croatia: PET, 2005)
129 See L. A.  Bygrave,  Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits , (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague / London / New York, 2002) 138–143 See also C.J. Bennett and 
C.D.  Raab,  The  Governance  of  Privacy:  Policy  Instruments  in  Global  Perspective (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003) 56-65
130 M. Mizutani, J. Dorsey, and J.H. Moor, “The Internet and Japanese Conception of Privacy,” 
(2004) 6(2) Ethics and Information Technology,121-128
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variations  in  cultural  forms  and  their  respective  privacy  conceptions131. 
Hence, the policies need not be common but neither should they be singu-
lar. Rather, they should be a conjunction of contexts, requiring the norms of 
each context to be respected.
4. PRIVACY: REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN INDIA
Regulating mechanisms operate in different combinations as a social  sys-
tem.  Every legal system has a core comprised of the system’s underlying 
principle: the general, constitutional and administrative norms that apply to 
any  legal  event  in  the  given  society.  Such  a  core  naturally  includes  the 
teachings of the constitution of the legal system as well as the basic prin-
ciples  and  values  underlying  the  various  legal  areas.  The  differences  in 
political systems and legislations in various countries can be interpreted as 
consequences of societal value differences and the degree to which mem-
bers of a society look to the government to remedy social issues.132
In the US and, until recently, Canada and Australia, privacy regulation 
has tended to be targeted or sector specific and to be aimed mainly at the 
public sector. This sectoral or voluntary approach contrasts with the omni-
bus approach in both the public and private sectors used by the EU. Unlike 
in  the  EU,  the right  to  privacy in  India  is  scattered across  various  legal 
fields. As a customary right, it  is treated as an easement forming part of  
statutory law and as a part of the constitutional right to life and liberty; it is  
considered  to  be  the  illustration  of  prerogative  development  of  human 
rights and basic freedoms.
Despite  pressure from internal and external fronts, India has tradition-
ally showed a general unwillingness to adopt specific privacy laws.133 There 
is  a significant  and positive relationship between concerns about privacy 
and the level of government involvement in the regulation of privacy.134 The 
analysis made earlier in the paper emphasises that India’s history has not 
131 The  different cultures will receive and interpret information differently regardless of uni-
versal concepts which all people share. The same information will not produce the same un-
derstanding. 
132 S.J. Milberg, H.J. Smith, S.J. Burke,  “Information Privacy: Corporate Management and Na-
tional Regulation” (2000) 11 (1) Organization Science, 35-57
133 Particularly I am critical of   Prof Greenleaf’s rather broad and stereotypical suggestion that 
India’s legislative framework is ‘inadequate to protect rights of individuals as much as it  
promises to do’.  See G. Greenleaf  “Promises and illusions of data protection in Indian law” 
(2011) 1 (1) International Data Privacy Law,  47-69 
134 See S.J. Milberg, H.J. Smith, S.J. Burke,  “Information Privacy: Corporate Management and 
National Regulation” (2000) 11 (1) Organization Science, 35-57
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been plagued by privacy abuses as Parekh argues because of the respect for 
privacy of the family and those breaking the norm are looked down upon 
and even ostracised.135 I am also inclined to argue here that India’s recent 
general reluctance to legislate for privacy protection may be deeply rooted 
in its colonial past.136
A country’s “legal origin” significantly affects the evolution of its legal 
rules. Due  to  the  greater  constitutional  independence  of  their  judiciary, 
“common law” legal institutions are thought both to exhibit a greater de-
gree of adaptability than “civil law” systems through their greater reliance 
on “bottom up” rule-making by the judiciary, as opposed to “top-down” co-
difications, and to be less susceptible to corrosion by politicians and bureau-
crats.137Although India is described as a common law country, having inher-
ited a common law legal system from the British, many of its laws were in 
fact  codified  during  the  British  rule,  and those  laws  were  driven  by an 
agenda of distrust that resulted in an array of rules and regulations that 
were almost impossible to uphold and at times oppressive in nature. In the 
post-independent India, these laws were then overlaid with further legisla-
tion when the government implemented a socialist reform agenda encom-
passing all areas of commercial  activity, which resulted in an obstructive 
bureaucracy and relentless overregulation.  The other consequence was the 
existence of the law as an ideology without connection to the institutions in 
society that flesh out the law. Hence, the system India inherited from the co-
lonial rulers suffers from three defects - delay, cost, and great uncertainty in 
the final outcome of any litigation. The system is a maze of complex proced-
ures together with a multiplicity of laws.  In the wake of this pattern, busi-
nesses in the private sector had to wait for months or years for a response to 
their  requests  for  government  approvals  of  entrepreneurial  projects  and 
many times they waited in vain.138This repressive environment caused an 
understandable fear of government regulation.139 It was not until the 1990s 
that this overly-stifling quagmire of excessive government control started to 
135 B. Parekh, “Private and Public Spheres in India” (2009)  12 Critical Review of International So-
cial and Political Philosophy, 313-328
136 India has recently implemented new regulations aimed at data security issues related to 
private sector uses of data but these rules are not intended neither designed to act as set of 
privacy rules (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or 
Information Rules, 2011 Under Section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000). 
137 J. Armour and P. Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India, (ECGI, 2008) Law Working 
Paper N°.107/2008, www.ecgi.org/wp
138 G. Das, India Unbound (Anchor Books, 2002) 216-218
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get dismantled, and since then there have been rapid and far-reaching law 
reforms.140 Furthermore,  the nature of coalition politics  in  India,  coupled 
with a very activist judicial review, means that passing legislation is a slow 
and erratic process, and consequently the scepticism about legislation pro-
tecting privacy is  comprehensible.141 This has also provoked questions of 
whether and to what extent the current constitution protects privacy in In-
dia. In the next section I take a closer look at the current Indian Constitu-
tional framework and whether the meaning of privacy in India has changed 
and, if so, to what degree and with what consequence.
4.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
The institutional underpinnings of ‘privacy’  presuppose certain law–state–
society relations. But there is a substantial debate regarding whether or not 
a ‘right to privacy’ exists under the Indian Constitution. However, I argue 
that we should be asking an altogether different question:  if  we were to 
deny that people have right to privacy, what would be the impact of this 
denial on the values that the Indian Constitution was designed to protect? 
The  Indian Constitution does not expressly recognise the right to privacy 
but there exists a belief that the Constitution contains certain rights other 
than those expressly mentioned in its content.  To establish the presence of 
such a right it must be shown that the right in question is an integral part of  
the enumerated right upon which its existence depends. The rationale be-
hind this formulation is simply that the enumerated right would be mean-
ingless without providing for certain other rights by implication. While In-
dian courts may not have explicitly analysed privacy as a concept involving 
both individual  and collective  components,  the  importance  of  the  social 
139 In India, there is no sunset provision for statutes which are not in force. Unnecessary stat-
utes remain on the statute books unless they are repealed. Some of these dysfunctional le-
gislations have been repealed on the basis of the reports of the Law Commission which 
have been accepted by the Government. But many of such statutes including some of the 
British Statutes are still cluttering the statute books.
140 See J. Bhagwati, India in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) See also A. Panagariya, 
“India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of Reforms” (IMF, Working Paper WP/04/03, 
2004)
141 At the time of writing this article, there are reports about India’s Legislative Department  
Working on Draft of so-called “Privacy Bill 2011”.  As the author understands the draft is at 
a preliminary stage and details of the Bill are yet to be finalized.  It would be unwise to be 
dogmatic about this Bill as  there have been no further public developments in relation to 
the draft since April 2011 and this is not the first time attempts have been made to draft 
such a Bill (see The Personal Data Protection Bill 2006, introduced in Parliament on 8 Decem-
ber 2006.  Bill No. XCI of 2006).   It is highly unlikely that the Bill will be presented in the 
current parliament.
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value of privacy has been implicitly recognised by the Supreme Court of In-
dia in certain cases.142
The Supreme Court of India in Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh ac-
cepted in 1964 that a right of privacy143 is implicit in the Constitution under 
Article 21, which states, ‘no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty  except  according  to  procedure  established  by  law.’144 The  Court 
equated “personal liberty” with “privacy”, and observed that: ‘the concept 
of liberty in Article 21 was comprehensive enough to include privacy and 
that nothing is more deleterious to a man’s physical happiness and health 
than a calculated interference with his privacy’.145 On the basis of this provi-
sion, the Supreme Court subsequently held that ‘those who feel called upon 
to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what 
they conceive to be their duty must strictly and scrupulously observe the 
forms and rules of the law.’146 More recently, in Menka Gandhi v Union of 
India147  the phrase “procedure established by law” has been held to have a 
meaning similar to “due process of law” in the US Constitution and with 
the phrase ‘in accordance with law’ in the ECHR. It would not be enough to 
say that a violation of privacy would be justified by law; it must further be 
shown that the law under which the violation has taken place is just, fair 
and reasonable.
In  People's Union for Civil  Liberties v. Union of India148 the Supreme 
Court held that ‘right to life and personal liberty includes the right to pri-
vacy and right to privacy includes telephone conversation in the privacy at 
home or office and thus telephone tapping violates Art. 21.’ In R. Rajagopal 
v. State of Tamil Nadu,149 it was held that the constitutional recognition is 
given to the right to privacy which protects personal privacy against unlaw-
142 The protection of privacy by the Indian courts has developed primarily from this constitu-
tional basis, rather than by Indian courts developing a tort of invasion of privacy (as in the  
USA or New Zealand), or by extension of the law of breach of confidence (as in the UK).
143 1 SCR 332 (1964)
144 Art 21 of the Constitution of India
145 Kharak Singh v State of UP, 1 SCR 332 (1964) The Court was greatly influenced by two US 
cases:  Munn v. Illinois 94 US 113 and Wolfe v. Colorado 338 US 25
146 See Gobind v State of M.P. (1975) 2 SCC 148, See State v Charulata Joshi(1999) 4 SCC 65 In M. 
P. Sharma v Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi AIR 1954 SC 300 the court held that, 
Power of search and seizure does not violate the right to privacy because it is in the interest 
of the State.
147 AIR 1978 SC 597
148 AIR 1997 SC 568
149 AIR 1995 SC 264
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ful governmental invasion, but in Indu Jain v. Forbes Incorporated 150 it was 
held that the enforcement of the right to privacy under the Indian constitu-
tional  scheme  can  only  be  made  against  state  instrumentalities  and  not 
against private persons.  At the time of the writing of the Indian Constitu-
tion, the house was seen as the central locus of intimate activities, and hence 
as the place where intervention of the government needed strongest justific-
ation.  Indian courts have interpreted the right to privacy as  the right to 
freedom from intrusions by the state. However, the most significant recent 
development related to privacy issues is the decision of the High Court of 
Delhi in the  Naz Foundation Case.151 The Naz decision extended the view 
by implying that it also protects the ‘autonomy of the private will and a per-
son's freedom of choice and action and it protects the core identity and dig-
nity of the individual’152 as cited earlier. But the notion of individuality in 
India is far more complex and multi-faceted, and to focus on only one level 
of behaviour would miss the point that one is dealing with a complex sys-
tem of needs, wants, and behavioural styles. The perception of privacy as a 
fundamental right changes depending on those concerned and the context 
in  which  this  right  is  being  exercised.  It  is  not  viewed  as  an  “absolute 
right”,153 but it is recognised as a right of “special significance”154 and it also 
recognises society’s interest in preserving privacy apart from a particular in-
dividual’s interest.
5. CONCLUSION
As this article was being written it seems that  new technology155 is appar-
ently threatening the very concept  of  privacy.  Perhaps what  was under-
stood may be thought of as the correct way the phenomenon ought to be 
understood. India is not a society without privacy – but it has a different 
perception of privacy from that to which we have become accustomed in 
150 IA 12993/2006 in CS(OS) 2172/2006 (High Court of Delhi)
151 Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi WP(C) No.7455/2001 (2 July 2009) The Court 
found that s377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 breached the right of privacy and rejected 
the claim that this invasion of privacy was justified within the exception to Article 21. It  
found that the State cannot invade the privacy of citizens based solely on considerations of 
‘public morals’.
152 Naz Foundation Case para 46-48 of the Judgement
153 Certainly, the Indian Courts did not recognise any natural right to privacy. See  C Krishna  
Murthy v  U Rajlingam (1980) AIR Andhra Pradesh 69, Para 8
154 In the case of State of Maharashtra v Madhulkar Narain it was held that the 'right to privacy' is 
available even to a woman of easy virtue.
155 Twitter and instant messaging in the words of Lord Neuberger are "totally out of control" 
and society should consider other ways to bring Twitter and other websites under control.  
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the West. India’s attitude toward privacy is more of “respect”, for rather 
than  as  a  right;  its  focus  is  more  on  where  privacy  concerns  “physical 
space” and “personal liberty” threatened primarily by the State rather than 
“informational privacy”. It is  more about practical rules based on “social  
morality”, “virtues” and “righteous” conduct. This attitude is  compatible 
with the social and cultural structure of the country where a high level of 
privacy is seen to have a detrimental effect on the trusting relationships and 
social interaction with others.
I set out to answer the question of how to reconcile traditional Indian 
values and concerns about privacy with the so-called Western ones. In this 
process, the article has highlighted the need to understand the ontological 
distinctiveness of Indian culture, social structure, and moral aspirations. It 
has argued for a differentiated understanding of Western and Indian per-
ception of privacy and for anchoring the debate about privacy firmly in the 
cultural experiences of India. Such an undertaking calls for interrogation of 
the relationships between form and substance of the law in socio-legal con-
text in India. Evidence suggests that in India compensatory social mechan-
isms are present, which allow for the regulation of privacy and where it is 
not present the Indian constitution is capable of providing the protection. 
Instead of following a strict regulative approach, India takes a prescriptive 
approach to the right to privacy through a peculiar blend of constitutional 
law,  social  norms,  conventions,  and  sanctions.  Privacy  is  understood 
through a process of “optimization”. To move to the heart of the matter, is 
there a need for reforming the law and/or is it a question of re-educating the 
people, reforming the culture? “Socio-cultural” issues unique to countries 
must be considered and appreciated in their own right. We must acknow-
ledge the existence of two different cultures of privacy based on different 
intuitive sensibilities.
One can accurately infer that regulatory preferences are in some measure 
a reactive function;  that  is,  when societal  expectations regarding privacy 
management are perceived to be unmet, a legislative reaction is likely to fol-
low. But the precise form of that reaction, and the expected policies for pri-
vacy, cannot be specified in a culture-free context.  What will  or will  not 
meet “societal expectations” is highly contingent on a society itself, and dif-
ferent societies will exhibit varying levels of concern about privacy, both in 
general and in their assessment of specific practices. The goal is to synthes-
ize  these  different  areas  of  knowledge  in  favour  a  balancing  framework 
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based on a realistic set of standards. The result will be legal pluralism that 
indirectly accounts for the co-existence of multiple experiences of the law in 
society  without  structural  and  systemic  ramifications  for  Indian  society 
within the wider international law. The implications of this view are signi-
ficant. Perhaps most basic is the assumed fact of human diversity.
Finally, the regulation of privacy cannot be focused just on legislation 
and in any event will soon prove too complex.  Perhaps the debate should 
not be between means and ends-based interpretations of privacy law, as this 
way of thinking has several  untoward consequences. Leith suggests that 
privacy is under-theorised and argues in favour of developing a socio-legal 
privacy theory.156 It is argued that instead of having an independent exist-
ence of the right to privacy as a statutory right, it is more logical to refer to 
privacy as an interest, which can be invaded for “public good”. I propose 
that this interest be imagined as part of a “collective good” which is import-
ant for furtherance of the “public good”, thus leaving it open to us to adopt 
a broader concept of privacy and how extensively it ought to be protected. 
What does exist is the attribution of human action to the private or to the 
public sphere, which itself is subject to change. There is nothing inherent in 
human nature that makes privacy valuable for all humans. The reasonable-
person standard originated from the necessity that life in an organised soci-
ety mandated a certain average of conduct, saying that a sacrifice of indi-
vidual peculiarities going beyond a certain point is necessary for the general 
welfare.   It is not a binary choice between two extreme positions, between 
black and white, but it does allow for more nuanced solutions.
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